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BY SUSAN L. CARLSON  
CLERK

Supreme Court No. 97369-5

Court of Appeals No. **35932-8-III**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

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STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent

v.

ERIC BUCK, Petitioner

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BRIEF OF PETITIONER

---

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PO Box 829  
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253-445-7920

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        The stop of Mr. Buck's car was illegal because the deputy  
        did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arising from  
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## I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Eric Buck, through his attorney, Marie Trombley, petitions the Court for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals in *State v. Buck*, Court of Appeals No. 35932-8-III.

## II. DECISION OF LOWER COURT

The Court of Appeals filed an unpublished opinion on May 30, 2019. The Court affirmed the conviction, with dissent by one member of the Court on whether the deputy had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Buck was engaging in criminal activity. A copy of the decision is attached to this petition as appendix A.

## III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A deputy saw a parked car near a Goodwill drop-off trailer in a supermarket parking lot. He drove by two hours later and saw the same car parked in another area of the lot near a different drop off center. Under Const. Art. I §7, do these facts give rise to a well-founded suspicion that the individual in the vehicle is connected to actual or potential criminal activity that would justify an investigative seizure?

## IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At 10:30 p.m. Eric Buck and a companion were parked within ten feet of a Goodwill donation trailers in a grocery store parking lot.

1/19/17 RP 7,10. Two hours later they had parked at a clothing donation shed in the same parking lot. 1/19/17 RP 11-12. Deputy Miller knew the Goodwill trailer closed at 6 p.m. and was not staffed. CP 16. He also knew that thefts had occurred at the Goodwill trailer after hours. CP 16.

The deputy pulled in front of the vehicle to prevent Mr. Buck from driving away. 1/19/17 RP 13, 22. He questioned Mr. Buck, who gave someone else's identification to him. 1/19/17 RP 17. The officer learned Mr. Buck's true name and arrested him on an outstanding DOC warrant. 1/19/17 RP 19. He was charged with identity theft in the second degree and possession of stolen property in the third degree. CP 1.

The trial court denied Mr. Buck's motion to suppress the evidence obtained following the investigative detention. CP 15-18. A jury convicted Mr. Buck of identity theft in the second degree, and he was acquitted on possession of stolen property. CP 92-93.

#### V. ARGUMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE OF REVIEW

This Court should grant review when a decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court or involves a significant question of constitutional law and is an issue of substantial public interest. RAP 13.4(b).

Article I § 7 of the Washington State Constitution, which is more protective than the Fourth Amendment, guarantees that “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded without authority of law.” Under Washington law, generally, warrantless searches and seizures are unconstitutional. *State v. Gatewood*, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539, 182 P.3d 426 (2008). Warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable, and the State must show the warrantless disturbance falls within one of the “few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions” to the rule. *State v. Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d 149, 157-58, 352 P.3d 152 (2015).

One exception is the *Terry* investigative stop. *Id.* Under a *Terry* exception, an officer may briefly detain an individual for questioning if he has reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); *State v. Doughty*, 170 Wn.2d 57, 65, 239 P.3d 573 (2010). The suspicion must be well-founded, individualized, particularized, and tie the detained individual to the suspected criminal activity. *Doughty*, 170 Wn.2d at 62-63.

In evaluating the reasonableness of the officer's suspicion, the appellate court looks at the totality of the circumstances known to the

officer. *State v Glover*, 116 Wn.2d 509,514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991). This "includes the officer's training and experience, the location of the stop, the conduct of the person detained, the purpose of the stop, and the amount of physical intrusion on the suspect's liberty." *Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d at 156. In evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine if a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct exists, the Court examines each fact the officer related as contributing to that suspicion. *Id.* The officer's actions must be justified at their inception. *State v. Ladson*, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999).

In *Weyand*, the Supreme Court identified the question is whether "the specific facts that led to the stop would lead an objective person to form a reasonable suspicion that [defendant] was engaged in criminal activity." *State v. Weyand*, 188 Wn.2d 804, 812, 399 P.3d 530 (2017). The Court emphasized in "evaluating the facts known at the inception of the stop 'it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).

In *Weyand*, the officer saw a car parked on an address that had not been there 20 minutes earlier. *Weyand*, 188 Wn.2d at 807. He ran

the license plate and it revealed nothing of consequence. He parked his car and saw Weyand and a friend leave the address. As the men walked quickly toward the car, they looked up and down the street. The driver looked around a second time before getting into the car. Weyand got in the passenger seat. Based on these observations and the officer's knowledge of the extensive drug history of the home Weyand had exited, he conducted a *Terry* stop. *Id.* at 532.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, that the late night, short stay at the known drug house did *not* justify a *Terry* stop. *Id.* at 811. The defendant's glances up and down the street did *not* provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. *Id.* The Court noted that although there was a known drug location, the officer observed no current activity that would lead a reasonable observer to believe that criminal activity was taking place or about to take place in the residence. The Court found that the officer had not articulated any reasonable suspicion that Weyand was involved in criminal activity. *Id.* at 817.

In *Fuentes*, the Court examined the facts at the time of the seizure: (1) the officer knew the area had extremely high drug activity based on 911 calls and drug dealing investigations; (2) the officer knew the apartment the defendant exited belonged to a woman with



numerous drug-related convictions including possession with intent to deliver; (3) the officer had express authority from the complex owner to trespass nonoccupants for loitering; (4) the car defendant rode in did not belong to any tenants; (5) the driver of the car slumped down when the officer drove past him; (6) the driver and defendant had different stories for why they were in the area; (7) The defendant looked surprised when he saw the officer; (8) the defendant visibly shook and looked pale when the officer talked to him. *Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d at 155.

The Court concluded none of the circumstances amounted to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. *Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d at 157. The officer admitted he did not have individualized facts to believe the defendant was engaged in drug activity: “he just felt the entire circumstance was suspicious.” *Id.* at 157. The Court held officer’s suspicious must be of criminal activity and it must be reasonable; a hunch is insufficient to justify a stop. *Id.*

Here, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court outlined the facts the officer used to justify the *Terry* stop:

(1) the officer knew the drop-off collection closed at 6 p.m. and that most thefts that occurred at that location happened at night and the victims intended to prosecute;

(2) Based on the officer's training and experience, he found it suspicious that the same vehicle was found in the same parking lot near the Goodwill trailer two hours after he initially observed it there.

CP 17-18. These facts fall far short of the necessary reasonable suspicion to support a *Terry* stop as defined in *Fuentes and Weyand Doughty*. The deputy was suspicious but had no individualized articulable facts of criminal activity. Intrusion on anything less than a well-founded suspicion is unreasonable. Circumstances observed by the officer at the time of the stop “must be more consistent with criminal than innocent conduct.” *State v. Thierry*, 60 Wn.App. 445, 448, 803 P.2d 844 (1991).

Here, the Court of Appeals decision stated “At that point, Deputy Miller had specific and articulable facts that someone from the truck was taking items as people dropped their donations off at the trailer or shed. This would explain why the truck remained in the parking lot for two hours and moved from the trailer to the shed.” *Slip Op.* at 7.

The record contains *no* testimony that Deputy Miller had facts that someone from the truck took items as people dropped their donations off at the trailer that night. Deputy Miller did not see anyone outside of Mr. Buck’s vehicle. And the testimony and trial court’s

findings were that Deputy Miller had no idea if the vehicle had been in the parking lot for two hours. RP 1/19/17 RP 36.

In *Doughty*, this Court held the “*Terry* stop threshold was created to stop police from the very brand of interference with people’s everyday lives. The Supreme Court embraced the *Terry* rule to stop police from acting on mere hunches.” *Doughty*, 170 Wn.2d at 63.

The decision in this case conflicts with this Court’s decisions in *Fuentes*, *Weyand*, and *Doughty*. Whether a police officer may seize an individual parked next to a Goodwill trailer after 10:30 pm at night is a significant question of constitutional law and is an issue of substantial public interest.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Review should be granted and the Court of Appeals decision should be reversed.

Dated this 1<sup>st</sup> day of July 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

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# APPENDIX A

**FILED**  
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	)	No. 35932-8-III
	)	
Respondent,	)	
	)	
v.	)	UNPUBLISHED OPINION
	)	
ERIC SHANE BUCK,	)	
	)	
Appellant.	)	

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Eric Buck appeals his conviction for the crime of identity theft in the second degree. We affirm his conviction but remand for resentencing because the trial court exceeded its authority when it imposed a sentence beyond the statutory maximum and when it imposed the deoxyribonucleic (DNA) collection fee.

FACTS

The State charged Mr. Buck with second degree identity theft and third degree possession of stolen property. Prior to trial, Mr. Buck unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence. He does not assign error to any of the trial court’s factual findings from the suppression hearing. Therefore, those findings are verities on appeal. *State v. O’Neill*, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571, 62 P.3d 489 (2003). We summarize those findings below.

On October 31, 2016, at 10:30 p.m., Spokane Sheriff Deputy Brent Miller drove past the Rosauers grocery store on Division Street in Spokane, Washington. He noticed a unique truck in the Rosauers parking lot next to a Goodwill Industries donation trailer. Deputy Miller knew that the Goodwill donation trailer closed at 6:00 p.m. and was not staffed after that time. He also knew that the Goodwill donation trailer had experienced thefts in the evening after the trailer closed and that Goodwill wished to prosecute the thefts.

Two hours later, Deputy Miller again drove past the Rosauers parking lot. He saw the same unique truck in the Rosauers parking lot, but he noticed it had moved from the Goodwill trailer to a donation shed not affiliated with Goodwill. As he approached the truck in his marked patrol car, the truck's driver attempted to drive away. Deputy Miller parked his patrol car in front of the truck to prevent this. The detention eventually resulted in Deputy Miller obtaining probable cause to arrest the driver, Mr. Buck, on suspicion of presenting false identification and possession of stolen property.

Based on its findings, the trial court concluded that Deputy Miller had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Buck was engaging in criminal activity and denied Mr. Buck's motion to suppress.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Mr. Buck guilty of second degree identity theft, a class C felony, but not guilty of third degree possession of stolen property. The trial court sentenced Mr. Buck to 50 months' confinement and 12 months of community custody—a total of 62 months. The trial court also imposed a \$100 DNA collection fee.

Mr. Buck timely appeals.

#### ANALYSIS

##### A. THE ARRESTING DEPUTY LAWFULLY DETAINED MR. BUCK

Mr. Buck first argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. The constitutionality of a warrantless stop is a question of law that we review de novo. *State v. Gatewood*, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539, 182 P.3d 426 (2008).

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an officer generally may not seize a person without a warrant. “As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.” *State v. Duncan*, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). “There are, however, a few ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions’ to the warrant requirement which provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a

warrant . . . outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate.” *State v. Williams*, 102 Wn.2d 733, 736, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *State v. Houser*, 95 Wn.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980)). The State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the search falls within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions. *State v. Garvin*, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). One such exception is the *Terry*<sup>1</sup> investigative stop. *Id.* at 249-50.

In a *Terry* stop, a police officer may briefly stop and detain an individual without a warrant if the officer reasonably suspects the person is engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal conduct. *Garvin*, 166 Wn.2d at 250. For the *Terry* stop to be valid, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop. *State v. Weyand*, 188 Wn.2d 804, 811, 399 P.3d 530 (2017). To evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion, we look at the totality of the circumstances known to the officer including: the officer’s training and experience, the location of the stop, the conduct of the person detained, the purpose of the stop, and the amount of physical intrusion on the suspect’s liberty. *Id.* at 811-12.

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<sup>1</sup> *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).



In *Weyand*, the arresting officer saw a car parked near 95 Cullum Avenue, Richland, Washington, that had not been there 20 minutes earlier. *Id.* at 807. He ran the license plate and it revealed nothing of consequence. *Id.* The officer parked his car and saw Wesley Weyand and a friend leave 95 Cullum Avenue. *Id.* As the men walked quickly toward the car, they looked up and down the street. *Id.* The driver looked around a second time before getting into the car. *Id.* Weyand got in the passenger seat. *Id.* Based on these observations and the officer's knowledge of the extensive drug history of the home Weyand had exited, he conducted a *Terry* stop. *Id.* The Washington Supreme Court held that the late night, short stay at the known drug house and the defendant's glances up and down the street did not justify a *Terry* stop. *Id.* at 812.

In *State v. Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d 149, 352 P.3d 152 (2015), the Washington Supreme Court resolved two consolidated cases involving suspects who visited apartments occupied by suspected drug dealers in high crime neighborhoods. In the first case, *State v. Sandoz*, No. 69913-0-1 (Wash Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014) (unpublished), <http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=opinions.showOpinion&filename=699130MAJ>, *overruled by Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d 149, the following facts preceded the *Terry* stop:

(1) the officer knew the area had extremely high drug activity based on 911 calls and drug dealing investigations, (2) the officer knew that the apartment Sandoz exited belonged to Ms. Meadows, who had numerous drug-related convictions, including possession with intent to deliver, (3) the officer had express authority from the complex owner to trespass nonoccupants for “loitering” at the complex, (4) the [vehicle in which Sandoz was riding] did not belong to any of the tenants at the complex, (5) the driver of the [vehicle] slouched down when the officer drove past, . . . [and] (7) Sandoz looked surprised when he saw the officer . . . .

*Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d at 155. The court held that these facts were insufficient to justify a *Terry* stop. *Id.* at 159.

In the second case, *Fuentes*, law enforcement surveilled an apartment of a known drug dealer. 183 Wn.2d at 156. During the two hours of surveillance, police saw approximately 10 people enter the apartment and stay between 5 and 20 minutes. *Id.* Marisa Fuentes parked her car across the street from the apartment, entered, stayed for about 5 minutes, and returned to her car. *Id.* She then removed a plastic bag from the trunk—about the size of a small football—reentered the apartment, and returned to her car with a bag that had noticeably less content than before. *Id.* at 157. Police then stopped her car on suspicion of narcotics activity. *Id.* Under the totality of these circumstances, the Washington Supreme Court held that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. *Id.* at 161. The court reasoned that the suspicion of drug delivery was sufficiently particularized given that the officers observed approximately 10

short-stay visits at an apartment with known drug use, followed by Ms. Fuentes's short stay and apparent delivery of the contents of the plastic bag. *Id.* at 162-63.

The rule from these cases is, to detain a person, an officer needs more than a generalized suspicion the person has engaged in criminal activity. There must be specific and articulable facts that are individualized to the person the police seek to stop. *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 21.

In the present case, Deputy Miller knew that people were taking items from Goodwill's donation trailer after the trailer closed at 6:00 p.m. Deputy Miller noticed a unique truck parked in the lot near the donation trailer at 10:30 p.m. Two hours later, he noticed the same truck in the lot but at a donation shed not affiliated with Goodwill. At that point, Deputy Miller had specific and articulable facts that someone associated with the truck was taking items as people dropped their donations off at the trailer or the shed. This would explain why the truck remained in the parking lot for two hours and moved from the trailer to the shed.

Mr. Buck argues the evidence was as consistent with innocent behavior as criminal behavior. He argues he could have merely left items at the Goodwill trailer at 10:30 p.m. and then returned at 12:30 a.m. and left additional items at the unaffiliated donation shed. We find this highly improbable. It is very unlikely that a person would make two separate

trips to donate items so late at night. In addition, “officers do not need to rule out all possibilities of innocent behavior before they make a stop.” *Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d at 163. The movement of the truck between the stations and the length of time the truck almost certainly remained at the lot were much more consistent with a person taking items as they were brought to the locations, as opposed to innocent activity. *State v. Thierry*, 60 Wn. App. 445, 448, 803 P.2d 844 (1991) (reasonable suspicion to warrant *Terry* stop requires an officer to observe behavior more consistent with criminal activity than innocent activity).

We conclude that Deputy Miller’s detention of Mr. Buck was based on specific and articulable facts that were individualized to Mr. Buck. These facts were much more consistent with criminal activity than innocent activity. We, therefore, uphold the trial court’s conclusion that the stop was lawful and supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

**B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING AN UNLAWFUL SENTENCE**

Mr. Buck argues his sentence exceeded the maximum sentence permitted for a class C felony. He also argues the trial court erred by imposing the DNA collection fee.

1. *The sentence term was unlawful*

A trial court may not impose a sentence of confinement and community custody that, when combined, exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense. *State v. Boyd*, 174 Wn.2d 470, 472, 275 P.3d 321 (2012). Here, Mr. Buck was sentenced to 50 months' confinement and 12 months of community custody—a total of 62 months. The State acknowledges that Mr. Buck's sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, we remand to have the trial court reduce the community custody term or for resentencing within the statutory maximum. *Id.* at 473.

2. *The DNA collection fee must be struck*


Mr. Buck asks this court to strike his DNA collection fee. In *State v. Ramirez*, 191 Wn.2d 732, 747, 426 P.3d 714 (2018), our high court held that recent legislative changes to a court's ability to impose mandatory legal financial obligations applied to cases on direct appeal. The trial court did not have the benefit of *Ramirez* when it imposed its sentence.

Mr. Buck argues these recent legislative changes prohibit the trial court from imposing the DNA collection fee against him. The State, noting Mr. Buck's extensive history of felony convictions, agrees. So do we.


No. 35932-8-III  
*State v. Buck*

In summary, we affirm the trial court's denial of Mr. Buck's suppression motion and his subsequent conviction. But we remand for imposition of a lawful sentence and to strike the DNA collection fee.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.


  
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.

I CONCUR:

  
Pennell, J.

No. 35932-8-III

FEARING, J. (dissenting) — Although the two decisions address diverging facts from this appeal, I conclude, based on *State v. Weyand*, 188 Wn.2d 804, 399 P.3d 530 (2017) and *State v. Fuentes*, 183 Wn.2d 149, 352 P.3d 152 (2015), that Sheriff Deputy Brent Miller lacked reasonable articulated suspicion of criminal activity to detain Eric Buck and Buck's vehicle. Therefore, I dissent.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Fearing, J.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Marie J. Trombley, attorney for ERIC BUCK, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of Washington, that a true and correct copy of the Petition for Review was sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, on JULY 1, 2019:

Eric Buck DOC 782028  
Washington State Penitentiary  
1313 N. 13<sup>th</sup> Ave  
Walla Walla, WA. 99362

And I electronically served, by prior agreement between the parties, a true and correct copy to: the Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney at [scpaappeals@spokanecounty.org](mailto:scpaappeals@spokanecounty.org)

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**MARIE TROMBLEY**

**July 01, 2019 - 12:27 AM**

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